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Member Countries 
Abstract 
Over the past two decades corporate governance has become one of the 
key issues in business and academic debates. The appropriate standards of 
corporate governance constitute important components of successful market 
economies. At the same time it is widely emphasized that contemporary 
mechanisms by which enterprises are directed and controlled are seriously 
defective. There is a need for profound reforms in corporate governance 
mechanisms. The growing interest in corporate governance codes among OECD 
countries is a very important component of these reforms.  
The purpose of the paper is to compare regulations in corporate 
governance codes in 27 EU countries concerning remuneration of top 
executives. It enables identifying two main mechanisms which are implemented 
in CG codes – market mechanism based on high level of remuneration 
transparency and hierarchical mechanism based on setting rules according to 
which corporate boards establish a formal procedure for fixing the 
remuneration packages of executives. The paper presents the discussion on 
determinants of these two mechanisms. 
1. Introduction  
The extent and manner of establishing CEOs salaries in the biggest 
corporations has for many years aroused  immense interest. It is a popular 
conviction  that extent and dynamics of this remuneration have no relation what 
so ever with company’s economic performance. Numerous financial scandals, 
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extensively covered and commented by media, deepen the grim sight of the 
situation in which managers, without any control and supervision on part of 
owners are in a position to attain incredibly big benefits at an expense of 
companies and  their shareholders.  
Today, a natural reaction to this kind of phenomenon involves attempts to 
normalize this exceptionally sensitive area of corporation performance. It is an 
element of a broader phenomenon of reforming mechanisms of corporate 
governance. The corporate governance codes are a result of activities aimed at 
streamlining standards of corporate order. The first in a series of such codes was 
the  so called Cadbury’s Code presented in 1992 by a Commission appointed by 
British government. Since then the work to create national regulations started in 
several dozen countries, and in all EU countries. Apart form national codes there 
are valid documents of a broader than national character, the most important of 
them the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
There are two basic aspects of codes which are the subject of regulation 
connected with operation of incentive schemes. The first one involves 
procedures of setting remuneration, its amount and structure. The latter involves 
paying attention to problems of transparency of information on CEOs salaries.  
These two aspects of code regulations indicate similarity to existing in the 
economy mechanisms of resource allocation described in the theory of 
transaction costs (Coase 1937). The first one concerns market co-ordination. The 
effective allocation of resources is implemented first of all by use of price 
mechanism. Market transactions are concluded between independent „agents”: 
companies, consumers, government. Market system works itself out. One of the 
conditions that must be fulfilled so that market allocation is effective is perfect 
market transparency. The entities operating in the market must possess complete 
knowledge about provisions at which market transactions are concluded 
including first of all prices at which the goods, services and production factors 
are provided.  
The market environment is not the only one determinant of entities’ 
behavior. The other mechanism of resource allocation consists in hierarchical 
co-ordination. This concerns co-ordination within a company. This co-ordination 
is of organizational character – hierarchical structure acting through planning, 
control, giving orders, recommendations, issuing bans (Gruszecki 2002, pp. 
210-211). The use of this mechanism is indispensable when market 
co-ordination is ineffective or costs of co-ordination through prices are very 
high.  
Provisions of codes regarding the question of CEOs remuneration indicate 
analogy to those two mechanisms of co-ordination. Recommendations regarding 
high transparency of salaries are meant to increase the efficiency of managerial 
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labour market. This leads to streamlining of such production factors like services 
provided by managers. Recommendations regarding formal principles and 
procedures for setting salaries resemble mechanism of hierarchical 
co-ordination. Off course, in the latter case there is a certain difference in 
relation to mechanisms described in the theory of transaction costs. Hierarchical 
co-ordination is not implemented under inter-corporate procedures, but is 
characterized by external regulations which however, serve similar function. 
They substitute market mechanism.  
In the further part of the study there will be presented proposals of 
solutions included in the recommendations of European Commission and in 
national corporate governance codes of EU countries with emphasis placed on 
these two types of recommendation. 
2. Corporate governance codes in EU countries and transparency of CEOs 
remunerations  
Open principles of paying CEOs should constitute a vital element of 
transparency in public corporations. Questions of compensation, its amount, 
structure in terms of fixed and variable components, in terms of long and short 
term elements, incentive schemes for directors participation in ownership, their 
termination payments, non-cash benefits etc. This concerns persons both 
managing and supervising companies (Hill 1997; Ward 1998).  
We shall start the presentation of principles of remunerating top 
executives of listed companies, with European Commission recommendation10. 
In the document adopted in 2004 the emphasis was laid on transparency of 
remuneration policy. Listed companies should disclose a statement of 
remuneration policy of the company (the remuneration statement). It should 
constitute a  part of an independent remuneration report which should also be 
posted on the listed company's website. The statement should also include 
explanation of the variable and non-variable components of remuneration, 
information on the performance criteria on which any entitlement to share 
options, shares or variable components of remuneration is based; information on 
non cash benefits. Remuneration of individual directors should also be disclosed 
                                                 
10
 Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 14 December 2004 on fostering an 
appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies [Official Journal L 
385/55] 
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including total remuneration and other benefits granted to them. The information 
should be disclosed in a separate report. 
Most national codes include recommendations to disclose  remuneration 
policy that applies to chief executive officers. First of all, it concerns principles 
of relation between fixed and variable components of compensation, 
performance criteria on which variable components of remuneration are based; 
performance bonuses, the reasons why non-performance criteria have been 
applied, principles of supplementary pension schemes, information on 
compensation paid to directors in connection with termination of their activities. 
Companies which use share-based remuneration schemes should additionally 
present description and explanation of setting performance criteria for shares, 
share options, the names of the participants in the schemes, conditions and 
frequency of schemes use, discounts and bonuses applied. 
The total amount of salary and fees paid to directors is a very important 
element of remuneration transparency11. We see here several levels of 
transparency. The most aggregated data show total salaries and fees received by 
persons managing and supervising companies.12 The more specific data refers to 
disclosing total amount of salary and fees paid to individual  directors. One can 
talk about real transparency  only when companies publish individual data  with 
reference to particular components forming remuneration scheme: basic salary, 
performance bonuses, postponed remuneration (shares, share options), pension 
schemes, termination payments. Such information should be presented for 
several consecutive periods since on this basis the tendency of company’s 
remuneration policy can be assessed.  
Supplementary non-cash benefits play an important role in incentive 
schemes for members of  managerial bodies. The benefits involve company’s 
car, free air-flights, telephone calls, cellular phone, business flats, private 
medical plans,  medical insurance  and examinations, professional development, 
paid holidays, payment of legal and financial counseling costs, low interest loans 
and many other. Only in 4 countries the companies are obliged to disclose such 
components, assessing their value. A lot of controversy is aroused by 
termination payments granted in situations in which for many reasons the 
manager is dismissed. Severance pays usually involve several components: 
paying several years’ worth of salary, granting share option or shares, granting 
                                                 
11
 In certain countries the requirement to disclose information abort remuneration has not been 
put into provisions of corporate governance, but there are references to other regulations, in Great 
Britain it is „Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002” as a part of Company’s Act. 
12
 This type of recommendation was included into Polish Code for Corporate Governance of 
2002. 
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supplementary benefits (insurance scheme, life insurance, supplementary 
pension scheme) (Borkowska 2001,  pp. 474-475).  Severance packages enable 
„smooth landing” out of a company so the literature calls them „golden 
parachutes” (Singh, Harianto, 1989). Eight codes include recommendation to 
disclose principles of calculating termination payments and costs, which the 
companies may face in the case of terminating  contracts with present 
management. 
Company’s transparency is a function of not only the range of disclosed 
information but also of the form of its disclosure. Only in 7 countries there is 
a recommendation to publish this type of information in the form of an 
independent remuneration report being a part of annual report.   
Table 1. presents comparison of national regulations with respect to 
transparency of information about directors’ remuneration in 7 fields: 
1. Description of remuneration schemes 
2. Description of long term share-based incentive schemes  
3. Remuneration of individual managers  
4. Components of remuneration 
5. Severance payments 
6. Non-cash benefits 
7. Standard form of presentation 
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Tabel 1. Corporate governance codes – transparency in the field of executives compensation 
Country Area of transparency 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
EU yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Austria  yes yes yes    
Belgium yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Bulgaria        
Cyprus  yes  yes yes   yes 
Czech Republic yes       
Denmark yes  yes     
Estonia   yes yes yes yes  
Finland yes yes yes yes    
France yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Germany yes yes yes yes   yes 
Great Britain yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Greece        
Hungary yes  yes     
Ireland  yes      
Italy        
Latvia  yes yes     
Lithuania        
Luxembourg yes  yes    yes 
Malta        
The Netherlands yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Poland        
Portugal  yes yes yes yes   
Romania   yes yes   yes 
Slovakia   yes     
Slovenia yes yes yes yes yes   
Spain yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Sweden yes       
Source: own work based on corporate governance codes. 
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3. Corporate governance codes in EU member countries and rules of 
compensating managers 
A vital feature of European Union recommendation is that there are no 
specific guidelines for  procedures of setting remuneration. The most important 
recommendation is the one about share-based remuneration. Schemes under 
which directors are motivated in shares, share options and right to buy shares 
must be approved by general meeting of shareholders13.  
Let us now turn to description of selected regulations adopted in national 
codes. 
A standard solution which occurs in almost all countries is 
a recommendation to set up a remuneration committee which should consist of 
only or mainly of independent directors (countries with one-tier governance 
system) or independent members of the board (countries with two-tier 
governance system). The codes with a recommendation to set up a committee 
usually involve defined obligations. The most important task of a committee is 
to table a recommendation regarding remuneration policy of chief executives to 
company’s board. The general rule is that none of the directors should be 
involved in undertaking decisions about their own remuneration.  
An issue which raises a lot of controversy is the obligation to obtain 
shareholders’ approval for long term incentive schemes for managers including 
first of all the option to buy shares. Such rigorous formal regulations imposing 
on companies obligations of this type did not exist earlier. The situation changed 
radically in the beginning of 21st century. It was a result of many factors. On the 
one hand a rising opposition could be seen on part of shareholders against 
application of such instruments of remunerating managers and on the other hand 
ever more companies adopted these solutions and benefits gained by managers 
on this account have many times outnumbered their remuneration in cash. 
Most national company codes include recommendations for long term 
incentive schemes for managers. First of all the companies are obliged to table 
such incentive schemes for voting by shareholders. In the case of remuneration 
in form of share options discount should not be applied. The price must result 
from market share price and there have even appeared demands that it should be 
                                                 
13
 Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 14 December 2004 on fostering an 
appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies [Official Journal 
L 385/55 of 14.12.2004] section IV, point 6 
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higher. There are time limits imposed on the implementation of options – 
usually 5 years from the start of a programme or till the end of employment in 
a company. Enforcing rights resulting from option schemes should be dependent 
upon company achieving  specific indices that cannot be modified whatever the 
trends in the capital market. 
Several codes name components which should be included into 
remuneration of chief managers.  Usually it is postulated to use a mechanism 
linking remuneration and overall performance of a company. Sometimes the 
parameters for assessment of performance are given14. None of the codes gives 
recommendation as to the individual remuneration of managers. The committees 
responsible for the determination of remuneration when taking such decisions 
should take into consideration not only company’s performance and assessment 
of individual managers but also average managerial salaries in the market, and 
remuneration paid to directors in comparable companies. Several codes involve 
limitations of termination payment paid to directors to a fixed sum or to total 
yearly remuneration. 
Table 2 presents comparison of national regulations with respect to setting 
managers’ remuneration in 7 fields: 
1. Appointment of a committee responsible for the determination of 
remuneration.  
2. Members of a committee.  
3. Tasks of a committee.  
4. Approval by shareholders of long term share-based incentive schemes.  
5. Rules for setting these schemes. 
6. Components of remuneration scheme.  
7. Criteria of setting components of remuneration scheme. 
                                                 
14 The Irish Code for example, postulates to use such criteria as earnings per share (EPS), the 
Dutch Code suggests market share price. 
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Table 2. Corporate governance codes – regulations in the field of executives compensation 
Country Area of regulations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
EU    yes    
Austria     yes yes yes 
Belgium yes yes yes yes   yes 
Bulgaria      yes  
Cyprus yes yes  yes    
Czech Republic yes yes yes     
Denmark    yes    
Estonia    yes    
Finland yes yes yes     
France yes   yes    
Germany      yes  
Great Britain yes yes yes yes yes   
Greece yes   yes    
Hungary yes yes  yes    
Ireland yes  yes yes   yes 
Italy yes yes yes     
Latvia yes       
Lithuania yes       
Luxembourg yes yes yes yes    
Malta yes yes      
The Netherlands yes yes yes yes yes   
Poland        
Portugal yes     yes  
Romania        
Slovakia yes  yes     
Slovenia      yes yes 
Spain yes  yes   yes yes 
Sweden yes yes  yes  yes  
Source: own work based on corporate governance codes. 
4. Comparison of national codes 
 While assessing guidelines for setting directors’ remuneration and scope 
of disclosure of information on remuneration presented in European 
Commission and national codes of corporate governance one can point out 
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several regularities. Particular emphasis is laid by EU recommendations on 
issues of transparency of information on remuneration, allowing companies to 
decide about procedures of setting remuneration. Only in one country in France 
the scope of disclosed information is similar to European Commission 
recommendations. 
On the other hand we observe certain specific patterns of relations 
between scope of regulation and transparency. Chart 1. positions particular 
countries on a seven – tier scale in reference to national codes. Fields of 
regulation named in Tables 1. and 2. were taken into consideration when 
building the chart. 
Chart 1. Regulate or disclose - the comparison of national rules 
 
EU – 1, Austria – 2, Belgium – 3, Bulgaria – 4, Cyprus – 5, Czech Republic – 6, Denmark – 7, Estonia – 8, 
Finland – 9, France – 10, Germany – 11, Great Britain – 12, Greece – 13, Hungary – 14, Ireland – 15, 
Italy – 16, Latvia – 17, Lithuania – 18, Luxembourg – 19, Malta – 20, Netherlands – 21, 
Poland – 22, Portugal – 23, Romania – 24, Slovakia – 25, Slovenia – 26, Spain – 27, Sweden – 28. 
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The drawing illustrates several features specific for groups of countries. 
Clusters I and III involve countries for which analyzed mechanisms are 
considered as alternative. In France, Slovenia, Estonia, Germany and Portugal 
transparency of information plays decisive role. In Sweden, Austria, 
Luxemburg, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Ireland and Italy more importance is 
given to issues of defining the rules of remuneration.  
Cluster II involves six countries: Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Great Britain and Cyprus. We observe extensive range of regulation in 
these two areas.  
Most countries (9) can be found within cluster IV, which is characterized 
by the least range of recommendations both in respect to guidelines for setting 
remuneration as well as to transparency of remuneration. It is symptomatic that 
economies of most of these countries undergo process of systemic 
transformation.  
It is difficult to clearly interpret the results of national code regulations 
distribution. The distribution seems to be conditioned by many reasons: market 
capitalization, ownership concentration, institutional and legal solutions of 
governance, development of national economy.  
The increased capitalization of stock exchange gives rise to a demand for 
transparency of listed companies on part of home and foreign investors. The 
demand is also affected by structure of sources of financing companies. 
Financing institutions have sufficient means of securing payment of liabilities by 
adequate definition of credit terms. Where company financing is based mainly 
on capital markets and shareholders are to a large extent dispersed, high 
transparency of public companies starts to be a key instrument of effective 
governance. Among six countries which place in the cluster III four of them 
exceed 30% market capitalization. None of the IV cluster countries exceeds this 
factor. 
Ownership concentration determines system of corporation control. High 
concentration (specific for insider system) allows investors more direct control 
mainly through participation in governance bodies. Under outsider system with 
dispersed ownership control over corporation activities is carried out through 
external market mechanisms, mainly through capital market. The type of control 
over corporation does not explain the distribution results. Into the cluster II 
found their way countries with relatively high concentration (Belgium 56%, 
Holland – 43.5%), as well as countries with low concentration 
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(Great Britain – 9.9%, - Spain 34.5%)15. Similar dispersion of results can be 
found in remaining clusters. 
Also institutional and legal solutions of corporate governance – one-tier or 
two-tier systems – do not really affect code recommendations adopted by 
particular countries. 
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